Dual-terminal event triggered control for cyber-physical systems under false data injection attacks by Wang, Zhiwen et al.
Kybernetika
Zhiwen Wang; Xiangnan Xu; Hongtao Sun; Long Li
Dual-terminal event triggered control for cyber-physical systems under false data
injection attacks
Kybernetika, Vol. 56 (2020), No. 2, 323–339
Persistent URL: http://dml.cz/dmlcz/148303
Terms of use:
© Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS CR, 2020
Institute of Mathematics of the Czech Academy of Sciences provides access to digitized documents
strictly for personal use. Each copy of any part of this document must contain these Terms of use.
This document has been digitized, optimized for electronic delivery and stamped
with digital signature within the project DML-CZ: The Czech Digital Mathematics
Library http://dml.cz
KYBERNET IKA — VOLUME 5 6 ( 2 0 2 0 ) , NUMBER 2 , PAGES 3 2 3 – 3 3 9
DUAL-TERMINAL EVENT TRIGGERED CONTROL
FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS UNDER
FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS
Zhiwen Wang, Xiangnan Xu, Hongtao Sun and Long Li
This paper deals with the problem of security-based dynamic output feedback control of
cyber-physical systems (CPSs) with the dual-terminal event triggered mechanisms (DT-ETM)
under false data injection (FDI) attacks. Considering the limited attack energy, FDI attacks
taking place in transmission channels are modeled as extra bounded disturbances for the result-
ing closed-loop system, thus enabling H∞ performance analysis with a suitable % attenuation
level. Then two buffers at the controller and actuator sides are skillfully introduced to cope
with the different transmission delays in such a way to facilitate the subsequent security analy-
sis. Next, a dynamic output feedback security control (DOFSC) model based on the DT-ETM
schemes under FDI attacks is well constructed. Furthermore, novel criteria for stability analysis
and robust stabilization are carefully derived by exploiting Lyapunov–Krasovskii theory and
LMIs technique. Finally, an illustrative example is provided to show the effectiveness of the
proposed method.
Keywords: cyber-physical system, FDI attacks, Event-triggered mechanisms, dynamic
output feedback security control
Classification: 93C05, 93B36, 93D15
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades, CPSs have been widely applied to many fields, such as smart grid,
smart transportation and smart city. However, the recent incidents, such as ‘Stuxnet’
and ‘WannaCry’, have led to intensive attention on security issues from different commu-
nities [1, 9, 10, 18, 19, 20, 24]. Owing to software vulnerabilities and hardware backdoor,
it is necessary to develop new strategies or methods to fulfill the full-dimensional security
defense.
FDI attacks, as one of the major attacks in CPSs, have been found in several major
power grid accidents around the world. For example, the power blackout of Ukraine,
in 2015, caused a worldwide concern as the power data was compromised by malicious
attacks [14]. The serious damages are not only in power communication network but
also in power grid hardware architecture [3, 10, 26]. Several incidents show that physical
defense can not provide comprehensive protection for CPSs. Since the lack of attention to
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the communication security for a long time, FDI attacks have become a real threat to the
safe and stable operation of CPSs [2, 13, 28]. Therefore, many works devote themselves
to the following security issues: 1) how to design an intelligent attack strategy to impair
CPSs without detection; and 2) how to protect the CPSs from being injured by these
malicious attacks.
FDI attacks are designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of network and hardware back-
door so as to compromise CPSs real data by passing the given bad data detection mech-
anism without being perceived [8, 10, 18, 25]. For example, Liang et al. illustrated that
attackers could take advantage of the network vulnerability to implement FDI attacks
which led to the blackout of smart grid [10]. In [13], Liu et al. showed that the attack-
ers could launch their FDI attacks through manipulating state estimation results and
avoiding bad data detection. Similarly, a more practical FDI attack, which named load
redistribution attack, was proposed in [16], then two mathematical models under the
consideration of the direct impacts and delay caused by such attacks were established. In
[15], the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of perfect malicious attacks
was proved and designed two attack regimes against the distributed control systems. In
[23], a further illustration of FDI model was proposed under the CPSs framework, while
no discussion on the stable operation control strategy was given.
From the perspective of defense, one should spare no efforts on stability and optimal
control strategies for CPSs. In [16], Pang et al. investigated the influence of the system
output tracking error under the two-channels data injection attacks based on output
tracking control law. In [19], the authors proposed an FDI attack model and an attack
collaboration strategy. An optimal ellipsoidal state prediction and estimation method
was presented in [6] for resisting certain attacks. In [21], a cooperative design method
of output feedback controller based on the two-side asynchronous events triggering was
proposed such that one can save communication resources, but they did not refer to some
security issues. In [27], random cyber-attacks in communication channel were taken into
account and described by a stochastic variable subject to Bernoulli distribution.
In this paper, we study the secure event-triggered control problem of a resource-
limited CPS under dual terminal time-delays and energy-constrained FDI attacks. Note
that limited communication resources, transmission delays and attacks are not rare in
practical networked systems [4, 5, 7, 22, 29, 31]. To the best of our knowledge, dual
terminal transmission delays have not been considered in designing event-triggered con-
troller methods with energy-constrained FDI attacks. Therefore, the operation interval
should be afresh divided into a series equal intervals when FDI attack and short time-
delay exists at the same time, and a novel DOFSC is proposed to reduce communication
burden with the DT-ETM. In particular, under the same time sequence, robust H∞
tools are used to make the impact of FDI attacks on the system within a controllable
range. By considering the energy-constrained FDI attacks, the dynamic output-based
security control strategy is proposed in this paper. The main contributions of this paper
can be summarized as:
1) A novel DOFSC model which includes bounded FDI attacks is well constructed
under DT-ETM.
2) Under the constructed model, FDI attacks are converted into extra external dis-
turbances of the resulting closed-loop system such that the security issue of the
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studied CPS can be handled under H∞ performance analysis and synthesis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The framework of the studied
CPSs and some preliminaries are formulated in Section 2. In Section 3, the stability
analysis of the system under the limited attack energy is presented. Then the co-design
of security and control is given in Section 4; The following Section 5 shows the numerical
and simulation results which can verify the given results; The last section 6 concludes
this paper.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
2.1. The framework description
The framework of the proposed dual-terminal event triggered dynamic output feedback
control scheme is shown in Figure 1, where the plant, controller, sensor and actuators are
communicated with wireless network channel. Here, the data packets are transmitted in
a single packet manner and there is no data loss or disorder, the bad data tampered by
FDI is integrated with the normal packets. In order to prevent information of sensor and
actuator from being lost, buffers whose lengths are greater than the biggest delay should
be separately setting at the sending points of the sensor and controller. In particular,
the length of buffer is predefined by comparing with the average delay of the system test







Fig. 1: The CPSs block diagram under FDI.
The sensor measures output y(t) with a constant sampling period h and we denote the
discrete measurement output y(kh) from the sensor to controller channel. The dynamics
of the CPS are described by
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) +Bũ(t) +Bww(t)
z(t) = C1x(t) +D1w(t)
y(t) = Cx(t)
(1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn is the system state vector, ũ(t) ∈ Rnu is the control input vector,
z(t) ∈ Rnz is the controlled output vector, and y(t) ∈ Rny is the measured output vector,
326 Z.W. WANG, XN. XU, H.T. SUN AND L. LI
w(t) ∈ `2[0,∞) is the exogenous disturbance. A,B,Bw, C, C1 and D1 are constant
matrices with appropriate dimensions. The initial condition of the system (1) is given
by x(0) = x0.
The dual-terminal event triggered mechanisms, equipped with the interested frame-
work, are used to reduce the data transmission. To facilitate description, we denote
the sampling set as Ss = {0, h, 2h, . . . , kh, . . .} (k ∈ N), the successful transmitted set
of sensor side as Sy = {0, i1h, i2h, . . .}(ik ∈ N), the successful transmitted set of con-
troller side as Su = {0, d1h, d2h, . . .}(dk ∈ N), and the arrival time set of each packet as
Sz = {t0 = τ, t1, t2, . . .}(tk ∈ N).
In addition, the attacker selects sensor and actuator locations to inject false data
Γuau and Γyay, respectively.
2.2. Dual-terminal event triggered
For clear purpose, we denote ikh as the latest transmission instants of ETM1 and ikh+jh









where scalar 0 ≤ δy < 1 is threshold, and positive definite matrix Ωy > 0 is weight
matrix. Once the trigger condition (2) is satisfied, the current packet is immediately
released through the communication network, otherwise, the current packet is discarded.
Therefore, the successful transmitted set of ETM1 is a subset of the sampling time, i. e.,
Sy ⊆ Ss. According to the event-triggered condition (2), the next release instant of
ETM1 can be described as









Similarly, we denote as dkh as the latest transmission instants of ETM2 and dkh+ jh
is the current triggering instant of ETM2. Then the next release instant of ETM2 can
be designed as









where scalar 0 ≤ δu < 1 is threshold, and positive definite matrix Ωu > 0 is weight
matrix. u(dkh) and u(dkh+ jh) represents the latest triggered moment and the current
triggering instant of the control law u(t), respectively.
Remark 2.1. The smaller δy, δu, the more sensitive to the state change, and the more
frequently control updates. It is obvious that if δy → 0, δu → 0, the event trigger will
operate in the periodic sampling style, i. e., Sy = Su = Ss.
Remark 2.2. It is different to cope with dual time delays for each side because the
values of τuk and τ
y
k are different and unpredictable. However, the uncertain delay can
be converted to the maximum delay by setting up data center buffer at the controller
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Fig. 2: The operation interval division diagram.
and the actuator side since 0 ≤ τyk ≤ τy, 0 ≤ τuk ≤ τu, and the corresponding controller
design parameters can be calculated. Therefore, the maximum induced delay in dual-
terminal communication network can be defined as τ = max{τy, τu}.
Considering the time delay τyk , τ
u
k of communication network for each side, we define
εk = ik+1− ik − 1. Then zero-order holder( ZOH ) interval of the sensor point [tk, tk+1)





where φtk`k = [tk + `kh, tk + (`k + 1)h), `k = 0, 1, . . . , εk. Further, it is clear that
φtk`k ⊆ [d̄kh+ τ, d̄k+1h+ τ) (4)
where d̄kh = max{dkh|dkh ≤ ikh + `kh} represents the latest triggered time of the
controller side up to the current triggering instant ikh+`kh with d̄k+1h ≥ ikh+(`k+1)h.
Considering the dynamic variability of the time delay, it is difficult to realize the time-
varying division of operation interval. In general, the value of τ can always be selected
as the maximum time delay collected during test operation.
In this paper, we are interested in constructing a dynamic output feedback controller
of the following form{
ẋc(t) = Acxc(t) +Acdxc(t− η(t)) +Bcỹ(t)
u(t) = Ccxc(t)
(5)
where xc(t) ∈ Rn, ỹ(t), u(t) represents state, input and output vector, respectively.
Ac, Acd, Bc, Cc are the real matrix with appropriate dimension.
The actual feedback action is given by
ỹ(t) = y(ikh), t ∈ φtk`k . (6)
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Then we can define a function η(t) and ey(t) as
η(t) = t− (ikh+ `kh), ey(t) = y(ikh)− y(ikh+ `kh), t ∈ φtk`k . (7)
Obviously, η(t) is a piecewise linear function with the following characteristics:
0 ≤ τ = η1 ≤ η(t) 6 η2 = h+ τ, t ∈ φtk`k .
Remark 2.3. If τ = 0, there is no induction delay existing or the induction delay
ignored, and the η2 indicates the maximum check update period. From Figure 2, it can
be observed that the presence of Zeno behavior is prevented as (tk+1 − tk)min = h > 0
can guarantee that the inter-event interval is strictly positive [11, 12].
From (4),(6),(7), we have the controller input ỹ(t) and the control output ũ(t),
ỹ(t) = y(ikh) = ey(t) + y(t− η(t)), ũ(t) = u(d̄kh), t ∈ φtk`k . (8)
Similar to (7), we can obtain the ũ(t) as follows
eu(t) = u(d̄kh)− u(ikh+ `kh), ũ(t) = u(d̄kh) = eu(t) + u(t− η(t)), t ∈ φtk`k . (9)
2.3. Data injection model
In order to characterize the FDI attacks, the channel selection matrix is defined as
Γy = diag(γy1 , . . . , γ
y
s , . . . , γ
y
n),Γ
u = diag(γu1 , . . . , γ
u
s , . . . , γ
u
n)
where γys ∈ {0, 1} and γus ∈ {0, 1} represent whether the channel is attacked,
γys = 1 and γ
u
s = 1 denote that the s channel is attacked and the data is compromised.
Then the false data injected by an attacker is descried as
ay(t) = [ay1(t), . . . , a
y
s(t), . . . , a
y
n(t)]
T , au(t) = [au1 (t), . . . , a
u




where ays(t) and a
u
s (t) represent the injection bias of the s channel at the time instant t.
Therefore, the compromised data can be expressed as
ỹ(t) = ey(t) + y(t− η(t)) + Γyay(t), t ∈ φtk`k ; (10)
ũ(t) = eu(t) + u(t− η(t)) + Γuau(t), t ∈ φtk`k . (11)




and combining (1), (9),
(10), (11) together, we have the following closed-loop system{
˙̃x(t) = Āx̃(t) + Ādx̃(t− η(t)) + B̄ueu(t) + B̄yey(t) + B̄wω(t)









































Note from above equation that eu(t), ey(t) satisfy the following constraints under the
same sequence φtk`k , namely, the event-triggered mechanisms follow the below conditions
eTy (t)Ωyey(t) ≤δy(ey(t) + CE1x̃(t− η(t)))TΩy(ey(t) + CE1x̃(t− η(t))),
eTu (t)Ωueu(t) ≤δu(eu(t) + CcE2x̃(t− η(t)))TΩu(eu(t) + CcE2x̃(t− η(t))).
(13)
The objective of this paper is to synthesize DOFSC for the closed-loop system (12)
under DT-ETM such that:
• The closed-loop system is asymptotically stable when neither disturbance nor at-
tack exists, i. e., ω(t) = 0.
• Under zero initial condition, the closed-loop system guarantees that ‖z(t)‖2 ≤
%‖w(t)‖2 for all nonzero w ∈ L2[0,+∞), where % > 0 is a prescribed scalar.





with ‖a(t)‖2 ≤ $‖z(t)‖2max ≤ $%‖ω(t)‖2 = γ‖ω(t)‖2, where
$ is a given constant greater than zero in relation to attack energy and γ = $%.
3. STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE DUAL-TERMINAL EVENT TRIGGERED
CLOSED-LOOP SYSTEM
In this section, Lyapunov–Krasovskii theory and LMIs method are exploited to analyze
the stability of the proposed framework of DT-ETM CPS under FDI attacks.
Theorem 3.1. For given scalars h > 0, τ > 0, % > 0, $ > 0, the close-loop system
(12), which subjects FDI attacks (10), (11), under the communication scheme (13) is
asymptotically stable with H∞ performance index %, if there exist scalars 0 < δy <
1, 0 < δu < 1, real matrices Ωy > 0, Ωu > 0, P > 0, U > 0, Q > 0, Ri > 0(i = 1, 2, 3),












< 0, i = 2, 3 (15)
where
Ξ21 = col{λ2, λ3, η1mλ1, η2mλ1, λ4},






i − λ1(η21R1 + η21mR2 + η22mR3)λT1 − e6ΩyeT6 − e7ΩueT7 − %2e8eT8 .
P r o o f . Choose the Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional candidate as
V (t) , V1(t) + V2(t) + V3(t) + V4(t) + V5(t) + V6(t),
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V1(t) = x̃


























˙̃xT (s)R3 ˙̃x(s) dsdθ,R3 > 0
where η1m = ηm − η1 , η2m = η2 − ηm , ρ = η2−η12 , ηm =
η1+η2
2 , ζ(t) = col{x̃ (t− η1) ,
x̃ (t− ηm)}.
Defining χ(t) = {x̃(t), x̃ (t− η1) , x̃(t−η(t)), x̃(t−ηm), x̃ (t− η2) , ey(t), eu(t), ω(t)}
and the following associated with the unit matrices, so the system (12) can be written
as ˙̃x(t) = λT1 χ(t).
e1 ,
[
















































































˙̃xT (θ)R3 ˙̃x(θ) dθ + ˙̃x
T (t)η22mR3 ˙̃x(t).
Based on the values of η(t), we consider the following two conditions.
1) If η(t) ∈ [η1, ηm) , t ∈ φtk`k , we use Jensen’s inequality for V̇4(t), V̇5(t), V̇6(t) to get






1 − [e1 − e2]R1[e1 − e2]T
}
χ(t),
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˙̃xT (θ)R2 ˙̃x(θ) dθ
≤ χT (t){λ1η21mR2λT1 −
η1m
η(t)− η1
[e2 − e3]R2[e2 − e3]T
− η1m
ηm − η(t)
[e3 − e4]R2[e3 − e4]T }χ(t).
If the condition (14) is satisfied, we use the reciprocally convex method in [17] for
V̇5(t) and obtain
V̇5(t) ≤χT (t){λ1η21mR2λT1 + sym{[e3 − e4]S2[e2 − e3]T }
− [e2 − e3]R2[e2 − e3]T − [e3 − e4]R2[e3 − e4]T }χ(t)
where sym{X} = X +XT .
2) Similarly, if η(t) satisfies η(t) ∈ [ηm, η2]. By applying the Jensen’s inequality and
reciprocally convex method for V̇4(t), V̇5(t), V̇6(t) respectively, we have that
V̇ (t) = χT (t)Θiχ(t) =V̇ (t)− eTy (t)Ωyey(t) + eTy (t)Ωyey(t)
− eTu (t)Ωueu(t) + eTu (t)Ωueu(t)− zT (t)z(t)





sym{λ1PeT1 }+ (e1 − e2)R1(e1 − e2)T − e1UeT1 − e2UeT2 + [e2 e4]Q[e2 e4]T
− [e4 e5]Q[e4 e5]T + λT1 (η21R1 + η21mR2 + η22mR3)λ1
− (3− i)(e4 − e5)R3(e4 − e5)T − (i− 2)(e4 − e3)R3(e4 − e3)T
− (i− 2)(e3 − e5)R3(e3 − e5)T
− (3− i)(e2 − e3)R2(e2 − e3)T − (3− i)(e3 − e4)R2(e3 − e4)T
− (i− 2)(e2 − e4)R2(e2 − e4)T
+ (3− i)sym{(e3 − e4)S2(e2 − e3)T }+ (i− 2)sym{(e3 − e5)S3(e4 − e3)T }
Substituting (13) and H∞ performance for both disturbance and FDI attacks into
(16), we have that
V̇ (t) ≤ χT (t)Θ̄iχ(t)− zT (t)z(t) + %2ωT (t)ω(t), i = 2, 3, (17)
where Θ̄i = Θi − e6ΩyeT6 − e7ΩueT7 − %2e8eT8 + δyλ2ΩyλT2 + δuλ3ΩuλT3 + λ4λT4 , λ2 =
CE1e3 + e6, λ3 = CcE2e3 + e7, λ4 = C̄1e1 +D1e8.
By using Schur complement, we have Θ̄i < 0, i = 2, 3. Therefore, for t ∈ φtk`k , we have
V̇ (t) ≤ −zT (t)z(t) + %2ωT (t)ω(t). (18)
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Then we manipulate integration for both sides of (18) from 0 to +∞, yielding
V (+∞)− V (0) ≤
∫ +∞
0
[−zT (t)z(t) + %2ωT (t)ω(t)] dt (19)
for all w(t) ∈ L2[0,+∞).
Under zero initial condition, it follows from (19) that∫ +∞
0




That is, ‖a(t)‖2 ≤ %‖ω(t)‖2. This completes the proof.

4. EVENT-TRIGGERED DOFSC DESIGN
In this section, the following theorem is given to design the event-triggered DOFSC.
Theorem 4.1. For given scalars h > 0, τ > 0, % > 0, the DOFSC of the closed-loop
system (12) subject to FDI attacks (10), (11) under the communication scheme (13) is
solvable with H∞ performance index %, if there exist scalars 0 < δy < 1, 0 < δu < 1, and
real matrices Ωy> 0,Ωu> 0, Ū > 0, X > 0, Y > 0, Q̄> 0, R̄i> 0(i = 1, 2, 3), S̄2, S̄3, and

















< 0, i = 2, 3 (21)
where

Ξ̄21 = col{λ̄2, λ̄3, η1λ̄1, η1mλ̄1, η2mλ̄1, λ̄4},
Ξ̄22 = diag{Ωy − 2δ
− 12
y I,Ωu − 2δ
− 12












−(e1 − e2)R̄1(e1 − e2)T
−e6ΩyeT6 − e7ΩueT7 − %2e8eT8
+[e2 e4]Q̄[e2 e4]
T − [e4 e5]Q̄[e4 e5]T
−(3− i)(e4 − e5)R̄3(e4 − e5)T − (i− 2)(e4 − e3)R̄3(e4 − e3)T
−(i− 2)(e3 − e5)R̄3(e3 − e5)T
−(3− i)(e2 − e3)R̄2(e2 − e3)T − (3− i)(e3 − e4)R̄2(e3 − e4)T
−(i− 2)(e2 − e4)R̄2(e2 − e4)T
+(3− i)sym{(e3 − e4)S̄2(e2 − e3)T }+ (i− 2)sym{(e3 − e5)S̄3(e4 − e3)T }
Dual-terminal event triggered control for cyber-physical systems ... 333
with 
λ̄1 = φ1e1 + φ2e3 + φ3e6 + φ4e7 + φ5e8,
λ̄2 = φ6e3 + e6, λ̄3 = φ7e3 + e7,





































P r o o f . Introduce X > 0 such that Y1 = N
T (Y −X−1)−1N . Clearly ,Y −X−1 > 0
because of Y1 > 0 and N is non-singular. By Schur complement, we can obtain that





N−1(I − Y X) 0
]






and Ψ1 Ψ2 are non-singular. Denote J1 = diag {Ψ1,Ψ1} , J2 = diag{J1, J1,Ψ1, I, I,
I, I, I,Ψ2,Ψ2,Ψ2, I} and
W1 = CcN
−1(I − Y X), W2 = NBc,
W3 = W2CX + Y BW1 +NAcdN
−1(I − Y X),
W4 = Y AX +NAcN
−1(I − Y X).
(22)
With a congruence transformation on Υ1 and Υ2, which are defined in (14) (15) by
non-singular matrix J1 and J2, we can obtain that
JT1 Υ1J1 = Υ3J
T
2 Υ2J2 = Υ4 (23)
after some simple algebraic manipulations. Here, Υ3 and Υ4 are defined in (20) (21).
Therefore, if Theorem 3.1 is satisfied, there exist real matrices Ū = ΨT1 UΨ1 > 0, Q̄ =
JT1 QJ1 > 0, R̄i = Ψ
T
1 RiΨ1 > 0(i = 1, 2, 3), S̄i = Ψ
T
1 SiΨ1(i = 2, 3) and W1,W2,W3,W4
such that the matrix inequalities in (22) is satisfied.
With the aid of xc(t) = N
−1x̄c(t) in (5), the DOFC gain matrices are given as
Āc = (W4 − Y AX) (I − Y X)−1,
C̄c = W1(I − Y X)−1, B̄c = W2,
Ācd = (W3 −W2CX − Y BW1) (I − Y X)−1.
The proof is completed. 
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5. SIMULATION EXAMPLE
In this section, we use a simulation example, which is borrowed from [30], to demonstrate



























 , C = [ 0 0 1 01 0 1 0
]
.
Set J1 = J2 = 1, k = 0.09 and d = 0.0219. The system initial condition is x0 =
[0.2,−0.3, 0.3,−0.2]T , and the system aims to move states to the original point xe.
Obviously, the eigenvalues of A are 0.0219 + 0.4237j, 0,−0.0219− 0.4237j and 0, which
means that the open-loop system is unstable.
Suppose that there are two measurement output channels and one actuator input
channel. Therefore, the false data injected channels {Γy,Γu} follow the form of
Γy ∈ {diag(0, 0),diag(1, 0),diag(0, 1),diag(1, 1)}
Γu ∈ {0, 1}.
The other parameters are C1 = [ 1 0 0 0 ], D1 = 0, ω(t) = 0.01 ∗ sin(2πt), h =
100ms, τmin = 20ms, τmax = 600ms, % = 100, and the simulation time is 100s. More
information about controller matrices Ac, Acd, Bc, Cc can be found in [30].
We select channels Γy = diag(1, 1),Γu = 1, and attack signals ay, au satisfying
‖ay(t)‖ ≤ 0.5, ‖au(t)‖ ≤ 0.2. The biased attack signals are arbitrarily and continu-
ously injected between 70− 100s.



























































Fig. 3: The amount of data injected into different channels in 70-100s.
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Based on the Theorem 4.1, the trigger mechanism parameters and the controller gain





, δu = 0.04, δy = 0.168, and
we select the DOFC for comparing the both state response in [30], where the event





. Figure 4 shows the
state response under the DOFC in [30].
From Figure 3, it is can be seen that FDI attacks are not continuous modification
data in the channel, but launched at a random moment since 70s. Moreover, ay, au
signals are arbitrary within a limited range.
Figure 4 shows that the system state gradually shifts to the origin before 70s. How-
ever, the state x(t) tends to be stable. Also, FDI attacks result in control performance
deterioration between [70, 100].
Figure 5 shows the state response under the proposed the DOFSC. It is clear that the
system state changes slightly and the H∞ control performance is achieved. The com-
parison shows that the proposed DOFSC can alleviate the effectiveness of FDI attacks.



























Fig. 4: State response under the DOFC1
in [30].



























Fig. 5: State response under the DOFC.
The following Table 1 shows transmission rates of 62.4% (ETM2) and 33.7% (ETM1).
The transmission rate of the system increases by 13.2% with FDI attacks.
No FDI FDI
Successful Bandwidth Successful Bandwidth
transmission saving transmission saving
Sensor side 337 66.3% 445 55.5%
Controller side 624 37.6% 779 22.1%
Tab. 1: The successful data packet transfer rate of FDI.
Figure 6 selects the event trigger interval diagrams between 55-70s and 70-85s for
comparison. One can see from Figure 6 that the event trigger interval decreases and
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Fig. 6: Time interval between adjacent event triggers.
transmission frequency increases significantly. These results are consistent with the event
triggered rules in Table 1. Although the transmission rate of the system is higher than
FDI-free case, the closed-loop system stability is preserved.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the dual event-triggered dynamic output feedback H∞ control for CPSs
under FDI attacks has been addressed. The comprehensive DT-ETM, which considers
FDI attacks and transforms the attack into an ‘extra’ unknown disturbance, has been
established to solve the security issues for the DOFSC of CPS. Then the Lyapunov
theory and LMIs technique have been employed to formulate the proposed stability
criterion. Also, the co-design of communication and security control law have been
derived. Compared with state responses of simulations between traditional DOFC and
the proposed DOFSC, the effectiveness of the proposed method is confirmed. In the
future, combined with the attack and defense game, the optimal attack and defense
model will be proposed , and the impact of FDI attacks on CPS security will be further
explained.
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